University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Political Science, Department of

3-1990

Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War
Randolph M. Siverson
University of California - Davis

Harvey Starr
University of South Carolina, starr-harvey@sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/poli_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons

Publication Info
Published in American Poltical Science Review, ed. Ronald Rogowski, Volume 84, Issue 1, 1990, pages
47-67.
Siverson, R. M., & Starr, H. (1990). Opportunity, willingness, and the diffusion of war. American Political
Science Review, 84(1), 47-67.
© American Political Science Review, 1990, Cambridge University Press
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR

This Article is brought to you by the Political Science, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

OPPORTUNITY,WILLINGNESS,
AND THE DIFFUSIONOF WAR
RANDOLPHM. SIVERSON
Universityof California
Davis

HARVEYSTARR
Universityof South Carolina
sing bordersand alliancesas indicatorsof opportunityand willingness, respectively,we test the relationshipbetweentheseand the diffusionof war during
the 1816-1965period. Theimpactof bordersand alliances,individuallyand in combination, on the growth of ongoingwar through"infectious"diffusionis shown throughthe
comparisonof baseline cases to cases where states at peace were exposed to various
"treatments"comprisedof warring border nations or warringalliance partners. The
findingsindicatethat the probabilityof war diffusionis substantiallyincreasedas opportunitiesand willingnessincrease,particularlywhen suchgeographicand politicalfactors
are combined. The applicabilityof the opportunityand willingnessframeworkto the
study of war and diffusion is expandedand confirmed.

A

considerable
amountof the early empiricalresearchon
war attempted to explain its onset by
looking at the effects of one or severalindependentvariableson a dependentindicator variable, such as, for example, the
nation-months of war (Singer, Bremer,
and Stucky 1972; Singerand Small 1968)
or the number of nations at war (Singer
and Small 1974). The initially unrecognized problemwith this procedureis the
conflation of the onset of war (a dichotomous variable)with the size of a war (a
continuousvariable).The problem,however, has consequences significantly
beyond what type of measurementis appropriate,since by using the size of a war
while the theory under investigation
specifiesthat onset is being measured,the
distinct possibility of diffusion is overlooked. This means that the process by
which the first two nationsin a war begin
fighting may be considerably different
than the process by which subsequent

participantsjoin the war. This blurred
distinction neglects what is usually
referredto as Galton'sproblem(Rossand
where
Homer1976).Undercircumstances
the
diffusionis presentbutunrecognized,
resulting models are necessarily
misspecifiedand most probablyinvestimethods.
gatedwithinappropriate
of thisprobBecauseof therecognition
lem, morerecentresearchhas movedin
two new directions.One of thesefocuses
on thebehaviorof theinitialparticipants
in warsandattemptsto explainonlytheir
extentthisis
behavior.To a considerable
the onsetof
by considering
accomplished
war as the end productof a disputebetweennations(Buenode Mesquita1981;
Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman1986;
LengandGochman1982;Maoz1982).
A secondline of researchis basedon
thatwarsmightdiffuse,or
therecognition
be "contagious."'
In general,researchon
thediffusionof warbeganwithdetermining the extentto whichwarswere"infec-
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tious" (Davis, Duncan, and Siverson
1978; Faber, Houweling, and Siccama
1984; Most and Starr 1981) and, after
establishingthat they were, seekingto uncover the factorsresponsiblefor variation
in the diffusionprocesses.In general,two
lines of investigationhave been followed
on the diffusionof war. The first of these
is based upon bordersas interactionopportunities (Most and Starr 1980;
O'Loughlin1984; Wardand Kirby1987).
The second centerson alliancesas indicators of groupsof statesthat shareroughly
the same internationalpolicies and may
be willing to fight together for them
(Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979;
Siversonand King 1980).
Thesetwo lines of researchon the diffusion of war-borders and alliances-have
only recentlybeen connectedin preliminary empiricalanalysis (Most et al. 1987;
Siverson and Starr 1988). In the present
researchthe data set has been expanded
significantly over previous collections,
new analytic tools have been added and
greaterattentionis given to interactionof
method, theory, and empiricalfindings.
In particular, the research we present
brings borders and alliances together
within a theoreticalframeworkbased on
the ideas of opportunityand willingness.
The use of this frameworkpermitsus to
examineongoingwars as events that alter
the incentive-constraintstructures perceived by foreignpolicy decisionmakers,
thus increasingthe chances that nations
will become involved in an ongoing war.
The analyses presentedhere will be conceived in terms of a research design in
whichparticularconditionsor sets of conditions are "treatments,"which may or
may not produceeffects.2

Opportunityand Willingness
in the Diffusion of War
Followingthe work of Most and Starr,
the diffusionanalysespresentedhere will
48

be developed within the general framework providedby the conceptsof opportunity and willingness (Most and Starr
1989, chap. 2; Starr1978a). As ordering
concepts, they form the basis for linking
environmentaland systemicfactorsto the
behavior of decision makersand governments that representstates.
By opportunitywe mean the possibilities that are availableto any entity within
any environment, representingthe total
set of environmental constraints and
possibilities. While opportunity thus
represents macro level (environmental
and structural)factors, willingnessrepresents the choice processes that occur on
the micro level, that is, the selection of
some behavioral option from a range of
alternatives. This framework is derived
from Sprout and Sprout's (1969) "ecological triad" of the relationshipamong
entity, environment,and entity-environment. In it their concepts of environmental possibilism, environmentalprobabilism, and cognitive behaviorism require
the combination of both structureenvironmentand choice-decisionprocess,
capturedin opportunityand willingness,
respectively.Thus, opportunityand willingness are concernedwith the relationships that nest decision makers within
their surroundingenvironments.
The centraluse of opportunityis as the
degree of interaction.This conceptionof
opportunityhas been the primaryimpetus
in Most and Starr'swork on the effectsof
bordersas interactionopportunitiesin the
diffusionof violent conflict. As in Sprout
and Sprout's environmentalpossibilism,
this simplymeansthat some activitymust
at base be physically, technologicallyor
intellectuallypossible. Once the obstacle
of possibilityis crossed,however, opportunity is, in fact, a continuousphenomenon in which some nations have more or
less of it with respectto other nations.
The dual nature of opportunity-possibility (especiallyas it relates to capabilities) must be recognized. Initially, some
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capability (technology, ideology or religion, form of government, manner of
organizingpeople to some task, etc.) must
be createdso as to be part of the rangeof
possibilities available to at least some
members of the international system.
However, there is then an importantsecond dimensionin the effects of opportunity-possibility-the distributionof such
capabilities in the internationalsystem.
At one level all internationalactors share
the samemenu of possibilities-for example, no nation could have had nuclear
weaponsto fight WorldWarI; the United
Nations could not have been used to separate the United States and Mexicanforces
in 1846;and any nation may avail itself of
the International Court of Justice. At
another level international actors may
have very different menus of possibilities-for example,the wealth, technological talent, and resourcesneeded to take
advantage of the nuclear possibility are
not evenly distributed across nations
today.
The concept of willingness is more
familiar, being central to the study of
decisionmakingand choice. The dynamics of choice are embeddedin a decision
maker'simage of the world, or definition
of the situation.Willingnessis relatedto a
decision maker's calculations of advantage and disadvantage,cost and benefit,
consideredon both consciousand unconscious levels. It is throughwillingnessthat
decision makers recognize opportunities
and then translate those opportunities
into alternativesthat are weighedin some
manner.
As is implied above, opportunity and
willingness are linked in a number of
ways. They do not createmutuallyexclusive categories.Anything that affects the
structuralpossibilitiesof the environment
or environments within which decision
makersmust act also affectsthe incentive
structuresfor those decisionmakers.Opportunity and willingness thus become
more than organizingconcepts.They take
49
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on theoreticalcharacteristics
when we
understand
that they describethe conditionsthatarenecessaryfortheoccurrence
of events.Theyarenecessarybutnot sufficientfor the occurrence
of international
outcomessuchas war.
Opportunity,conceivedof as interaction opportunity,has beencentralto the
geopolitical
studyof positivespatialdiffusion.Thishasbeenmostexplicitlyandextensivelydevelopedby Most and Starr,
who usebordersas theinteraction
opportunity through which violent conflict
would spread.Bordersare investigated
andconceptualized
as "constraints
on the
interaction opportunitiesof nations"
(StarrandMost1976).Simplegeographic
proximity,as indicatedby bordersof
various kinds, is related to both the
amountof interaction
andtheprobability
of varioustypes of interaction,such as
war (see Starrand Most1978).To some
extent,bordersrepresenta proximitybetweenstatesthat increasesboth the salienceof theneighboring
territories
and(in
general)the ease of interaction.Thus,
becausestatesareprobablymorelikelyto
be more attunedto, and involved in,
politicalsituationson theirborders,there
is a tendencyfor opportunity
to shapethe
range of willingness-althoughpower
certainlyaffordssomenationsthe possibilityof very wide openingsfor defining
theirborders.Briefly,the variousworks
of MostandStarrarguethatopportunity
forinteraction
is a necessaryconditionfor
the positive spatialdiffusionof violent
conflict,thatbordersareone factorprovidingsuchan opportunity,and thatthe
empiricalevidencefor the1946-65period
indicatesthatpositivespatialdiffusionof
violentconflictoccurredalongthe easementsprovidedby borders.
It needsto be emphasizedthat within
sucha warringbordernationframework
it is not reasonedthatborderscause wars
but ratherthat they contributeto the
potentialoutbreakof violencebecausethe
morebordersa nationhas, thegreater(1)
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the number of risks and opportunities
confrontingthe nation, (2) the likelihood
that the nation or its territorieswill be
"conditionally viable" (Boulding 1962),
and (3) the level of that nation's uncertainty. Under these conditions, it is
asserted,nations have a greaterprobability of going to war (see also Diehl and
Goertz 1988).
Additionally, Most and Starr argue
that once a war starts on a nation's
border, that nation may find its environment changedin such a way that it either
participatesin a war it did not intend to
join or forgoes fightinga war that it had
intendedto join. The warringbordernation model thus analyzes whether states
that experiencethe treatmentof having a
warringnation on theirbordershave their
environmentand decisioncalculusaltered
so as to alter the probabilityof theirown
subsequentwar involvement,or not. (See
Starrand Most 1985 for a full elaboration
of the warringbordernation model.)
Whileborderscan in generalbe conceptualized as an "agent"of diffusion representing the effects of opportunity,
another such agent, alliances, represents
willingness.3 Numerous observers of
alliances in internationalrelations have
commented on their entangling nature.
Followingthis generalline of argument,a
second approachto the problem of war
diffusionhas thus focusedon the extentto
which alliance commitments could be
responsiblefor the diffusionof wars.
Siversonand King (1979, 1980)explore
the extentto which the independenteffect
of alliancemembershipsand the attributes
of differenttypes of alliancesaccountfor
the extentand characterof war diffusion.
Recognizingthe work of Most and Starr
on diffusion and borders, Siverson and
King argue that alliances, unlike geography, result from a deliberateprocess of
policy choice. States clearly have much
greater latitude in their choice of allies
than the stateson theirborders.4It is thus
important to recognize alliances as
50

interactionopportunities.
manipulable
Moreimportantly,it is reasonableto
look at alliancesas a consciouschoice
amongforeignpolicybehaviorsor policy
positions.The willingnessto form alliances-and with specificpartners-may
be seenas an indicatorof sharedpolicy
Putsimply,two (orn) nations
preference.
formingan allianceare indicating,to
somedegree,thattheysharepolicypreferences.5This conceptionof alliances,implicit in the work of Siversonand King, is
explicitly developed in Bueno de Mesquita's (1981) model of expected utility,
an approachcenteredon the calculations
that lead to willingness.6
The researchwe reporthereseeks to investigate the effects of both opportunity
and willingnesson the diffusion of war.
This will be done by looking at the individual and combined effects of borders
and alliances on the diffusion of war
among members of the international
system over the period 1816-1965.

Research Design and Data

Generation
While several studies of conflict diffusion have relied on varieties of autocorrelation (Hill and Rothchild 1986;
O'Loughlin1984), the methodwe chose is
considerablysimpler.It has muchin common with variousepidemiologicalmodels
in that it examines the magnitudeof the
effectsof being exposedto variousconditions as treatments.More specifically, it
allows us to explore various changes in
the probabilitythat nations will enter an
ongoing war if they have a warring
border nation (WBN) or a warring alliance partner(WAP).
In order to evaluate the impact of
WBNsand WAPs on the diffusionof war
we constructed a data set containing
several types of informationon national
borders, national alliance commitments,
and nationalwar participation.Data were
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collectedand coded in orderto test both a
WBN hypothesisand a WAP hypothesis.
Thus, the WBN hypothesisand the WAP
hypothesismay be tested separately,and
the strengthof the resultscompared.The
data also permitus to look at the impact
of a nation'sborderingstatesthat are also
allies. This will enable us to test the combined treatmentof a nation'sbeingboth a
WBN and a WAP. Again, the results of
these analyses may be compared to the
results of the analyses of each factor
singly.
In orderto make the appropriatecomparisons, however, it is necessary to do
more than simply record the relevant
border and alliance informationfor the
instancesin which nations entereda war.
Doing so would tell us somethingabout
the process of diffusion, but such a procedurewould deal only with "successful"
cases in which diffusion took place. The
cases in which a nation experiencedsome
type of eithera WBNor WAP but did not
enter the war would be lost from view;
hence, no estimatecould be made of the
effect of the variableon the largerpopulation within which these nations exist
(see Most and Starr 1989, esp. chaps.
3-5).
In order to pursue our purpose of
assessing the joint and individual effects
of bordersand allianceson the war experiencesof states, it was necessaryto bring
together data on war participation,alliances, and bordersof each state in the internationalsystem for each year between
1815 and 1965. Informationon the set of
states in the system, war participation,
and national alliance commitmentswas
relativelyeasy to acquire.The set of states
was takenfrom the lists providedin Small
and Singer (1982). We also noted the
power statusof the variousnations, using
a simple division of nations into either
majorpower or minor power status.7
There are, of course, several generally
available data sets on internationalwar,
including,most notably, those of Kende
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(1971, 1978), Richardson (1960), Small
and Singer (1982), and Wright (1965).
Most and Starr'sinitialdiffusionanalyses
useda combinationof all thesesources,as
those analyses, in actuality, investigated
the diffusion of any organized violent
conflict(whetherit was civil war, internal
conflict, or intervention or relatively
small-scaleviolence)as well as large-scale
organized interstate violence. We,
however, focus on interstatewar for the
entire state system over the postNapoleonicera.
We thus selectedthe larger-scaleinterstate war data set presentedin Small and
Singer1982, whichrepresentsan updating
and refinement of a well-established
earliereffort by the same authors(Singer
and Small1972)to presentthe data of the
Correlates of War Project. There were
several other reasons to select this war
data set. First,it incorporatesa greatdeal
of the informationcontainedin the earlier
studies by Wright(1965)and Richardson
(1960). The data used here cover more
contemporaryevents than the compilations by Wrightand Richardsonbut also
cover much earlier periods than the
post-1945 data of others (e.g., Kende).
Finally, utilizing Small and Singer'sdata
will make our findings compatible with
the growing body of empiricalwork that
has derived from the Correlatesof War
Project(Gochmanand Sabrosky1990).
The alliancedata also are a productof
the Correlatesof WarProject.In this case
we drewupon Sabrosky's(1975)extensive
revision of an earlierwork by Singerand
Small (1968) that provided an initial listing of formal internationalalliances between states during the period 18151965. In the case of eachalliance,we identified its class as coded by Singer and
Small: defense, neutrality, or entente.
These will be referredto as Al, A2, and
A3, respectively.
We view these types of alliance commitmentsas forming an ordinal index of
willingness.Using Sabrosky'sdiscussion,
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Garnham(1988, 15) outlines these three
types of alliances as developed by the
Correlatesof War Project:"Thestrongest
alliancecommitmentis a defensepact, . . .
in which the signatoriesagreeto intervene
militarilyin the event of an attackon one
of their number.Next, insofar as the formal strengthof the allianceis concerned,
is the neutrality or nonaggressionpact,
... which obligatesthe signatoriesto remain militarily neutral should one of
thembecomeinvolved in a war.... Finally, the entente . . . merely required
consultations or conversationsif one of
the signatorieswas attacked."Thus, we
expect that WAPs involving defensive
alliances (Al) will have a greater likelihood of producingdiffusionthan nonaggressionpacts (A2) or finally the ententes
(A3).
The most difficultdata to gather were
those indicating which states shared
borders. However, through the use of
several excellent historical atlases
(Shepherd1932 and HammondHistorical
Atlas of the World), it was possible to
ascertain the border network of states
back to 1815. Specifically,in a modified
version of the coding rules used by Starr
and Most (1976), we recorded for each
state the entities on its contiguous
borders, those across less than two hundredmiles of open water and those on the
borders of its colonial possessions.8We
refer to these as Bi, B2, and B3, respectively.
As noted, we regardthe divisionsof the
borderand alliancevariablesas havingan
ordinalvalue. In termsof the opportunity
and willingness concepts discussed we
hypothesizethat the greatestopportunity
is present with contiguous borders, then
cross-waterborders, and finally, colonial
borders (Starr and Most 1976). At that
point considerable variation is introduced. Similarly,the greatestwillingness
should be presentwith defense alliances,
then neutrality agreements, and then
ententes.
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Using the nation-yearas the basic unit
of analysis, the completion of the data
collection eventuated in a data set of
3,929 cases, representinga coding of the
borders, alliances, and war participation
of all nations in all years between 1816
and 1965 in which a war eitherstartedor
was ongoing. However, to make our test
as rigorous as possible we removed a
numberof cases. First,in orderto test for
diffusion as the growth of war it was
necessaryto removethe initialtwo participants in a war. Second, once a nation
entereda war it was deletedfrom the data
set until the war was concludedor the nation left the war. These reductionsproduced a final data set of 3,749 cases.
Withinthis data set therewere 94 cases of
war diffusionwhose existencewe will attempt to explain on the basis of opportunity and willingness.9
In orderto differentiatepositive spatial
diffusion from both reinforcementphenomena and negative spatial diffusion, a
set of expectations was derived and
tested. The procedureusedhereis derived
from one used in an earlierstudy by Starr
and Most (1983, pp. 110-11).1OIn their
design they began by "looking for all
states at any given point in time which
were at peace (to avoid complications
with 'reinforcement'effects) and asked
two questions: (1) at what point in time
did they have any warring border nations? (2) Within the next five years did
they have any new war participations?"
There is one major deviation in the
present study from the design set out
above. Insteadof looking at a treatment
at time tOand subsequentbehavior only
during the t1-t5 period, we have looked
at all years (tO)in which the international
system was experiencingwar (some 83
years between 1816 and 1965) and examined the extent to which nations not at
war in t - 1, eitherwere or were not exposed to various combinationsof WBNs
or WAPs and either did or did not go to
war in year tO.Recall that once a nation
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entersa war, it is removedfrom the data
set until the war is ended or the nation
leaves the war. Underthis procedureit is
possiblethento aggregatethe resultsof all
war years for each of the treatments.
This proceduremade it possible for us
to estimate and compare the effects of
various combinations of WBNs and
WAPs. Moreover, by running identical
tables for the conditionsof any borderor
any alliancewe were able to estimatethe
extentto which WBNsand WAPs made a
difference over counterpart conditions
where war as a condition or treatment
was absent;that is, we could comparethe
effectsof havinga contiguousWBNto the
effects of simply having contiguous
bordernations or compare the effects of
having a defensepact WAP to the effects
of simply having defense pact partners.
Delineating the effects of the various
types and combinations of borders and
alliances without WBNs or WAPs thus
gives us a set of baselinesfor comparing
the war-joiningrate of those states with
WBNs or WAPs.
The logic of our investigationof diffusion centers on the notion of treatment,
that is, the notion that the environmentof
the decision makers of states will have
been changedby the existenceof war in a
borderingnation or in one of its alliance
partners.As developedby Starrand Most
in regardto borders(1976), and in terms
of foreign policy decisions in general
(Most and Starr 1989), such treatments
may alter the opportunitiesfacing decision makersas well as theirwillingnessto
pursue certain behavioral alternatives,
such as going to war. The argumentalso
follows our notions that states' interactions will tend to follow along the paths
provided by interaction opportunities
such as proximity(borders)and common
policy interests-highvalue salience (alliances).
The theoretical basis of opportunity
and willingness,as well as for interaction
opportunity,has beendevelopedat length
53

by Most and Starr (1980, 1989). The
WBNmodelderivesfromthe notion of interaction opportunity-the physical
possibilities for interaction, factors that
increasethe probabilitythat such interaction will take place, and the perceptionof
both possibility and probabilityby decision makers. This idea is rooted in the
ecological and geopolitical concepts and
formulations of Sprout and Sprout
(1969), as later modified by Starr'sconcepts of opportunity and willingness. It
should be recognizedthat the concept of
opportunityencompassesimportantcomponents of the geographical theory of
proximityand its effects (Boulding1962;
Gleditsch1969;and Zipf 1949).Forexample, Boulding'sloss-of-strengthgradient
links geographicalcomponentsto threat
perception and the role of uncertainty
(Midlarsky1975).
Our expectationson the effects of such
treatments also may be seen within a
'loose necessity" framework; that is,
these treatmentsare to be seen as loosely
necessarybut not sufficientfor influencing the war-joiningbehaviorof states.We
are not arguing that such treatments
always lead to joining ongoing wars but
that war behavioris much more likely to
occur if such treatmentshave occurred.
This is the "loose"aspect of the logically
necessaryrelationshipbetween treatment
and consequence.The key to these expectations is cell d in Table 1, which sets out
our basic treatmentmatrix. Cell d indicates that a state has joined a war subsequent to being exposed to the relevant
treatment.The centralexpectationis that
Table 1. The Border-Alliance
TreatmentMatrix
War
Participation
Absent
Present

Absent
a
c

Treatment
Present
b
d

AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 84
thereshouldbe a clearandstrongdifference in cell d betweenmatriceswhere
thereis a treatmentand matriceswhere
there is no treatment;that is, analyses
presentedwill contrastthe resultsfound
in a matrixwhere the columnssimply
notethepresenceor absenceof bordersor
alliancesto the resultsof a matrixthat
looks like the one presentedin Table1,
wherewarringbordernationsor warring
alliancepartnerscomprisethe treatment
columns.
Thisis a simpleidea:beingexposedto a
treatmentwill, using Alcock's (1972)
phrase,increasethe chancesof "catching
the war disease."We askwhattheworld
should"looklike"if a statehasa bordering stateat war or an alliance-partnerat
war. Our expectationis that a WBNor
WAP should substantiallyincreasethe
probabilityof that state's joining the
ongoingwarof its WBNor WAR A further expectationis that this probability
shouldincreasewith the combinationof
borderandalliancetreatments.
Thus,we
have taken one of severalpossibleapproachesto diffusion-thegrowthof ongoingwars.Wehaveidentifiedtwopossible ("looselynecessary")
agentsby which
those wars would grow. We have then
positeda simpleexpectationof behavior
given 'treatments'
by those agents.The
followingsectionpresentsdatathat simply but directlytest theseexpectations.
Findings
Initially,it may be noted that the overall rate of war diffusionis rathersmall. In

the 3,746 nation-yearsin our data set
therewere only 94 cases of war diffusion.
The overall rate of diffusion is thus
2.51%. War diffusion is, to be sure, a
relatively rare event, but rare does not
mean "unimportant."Many statistically
rare events are of considerableinterestto
scientists, particularlywhen their consequences are either highly lethal or very
costly. Forexample,both lung cancerand
54

earthquakesare both relatively rare, but
arenonethelessthe objectsof attentionfor
very large, nationally organizedresearch
efforts. War diffusion is both lethal and
costly. Of the 240 cases of international
war involvementin the Singerand Small
data set, the 94 caseswe studiedrepresent
39% of the total. Additionally, a great
deal of the severity of war (i.e., how
many die) may be explainedin terms of
the expansionor growth of war. In fact,
from the datain Smalland Singer's(1982)
considerationof lethality in warfare,it is
clear that most of the war-relateddeaths
take place because of war expansion.
Because war diffusion is a relatively
rare event, it may be seen that under
"loosenecessity"a large numberof treatments resultin a much smallernumberof
cases of war diffusion. In this respect
several points should be noted. First,we
investigate here only one form of diffusion-infection, or the growth of an ongoing war. We do not deal with demonstrationeffects. Also if only the opportunity for interaction was of concern, we
might expect ongoing wars to grow to include all those nations with opportunity.
However, willingnessis importantin such
decisions. Put differently, decision
makers choose behavior within the constraints posed by the range of incentive
structureswithin which they are imbedded. The effects of WBNs and WAPs are
just one aspect of that structure.While
other aspectsof the structuremay lead to
the willingness to choose other foreign
policy behaviors, it is impressivethat the
opportunityand willingnessmodel of interaction opportunity is able to identify
WBNs and WAPs as factorshaving a significant impact on war-joiningbehavior.
The data analysiswill take place in two
stages. First,we will explorethe extentto
which the variables measuringopportunity and willingnesshave anythingto do
with war expansion. Put differently,we
will show that there is a significantrelationshipbetween the various measuresof
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Table 2. No Treatment, Treatments, and War Involvement, 1816-1965
WarringBorderor
WarringAlliancePartner

Borderor Alliance
War
Involvement

No

No
Yes

14
1

(No Treatment)
Yes
Total
3,641
93

3,655
94

opportunityand willingnessand prodivities to join a war. That done, the second
part of our data analysiswill be to examine how various individualand combined
treatmentsaffect war-joiningbehavior.

Do Opportunityand Willingness
InfluenceWar Diffusion?
From the previous discussion of opportunity and willingness it is obvious
that we expect nations that have been
exposed to either WBNs or WAPs will
have a higher propensity to join a war
than those that have not. We begin our
analysisby examiningthe extentto which
this expectation is borne out. Table 2
reports two initial parts of this analysis.
The left half presentsthe cross tabulation
of a nation's having any border or any
allianceand beinga war joiner.Exceptfor
the 15 cases in the first column, this baseline is the same as the overall baseline. It
is readilyapparentthat the table contains
no relationship-"'Moving to the right
half, it may be seen that when a nation is
exposedto any of the treatments,the propensity to join a war increasessubstan-

No

(Treatment)
Yes

Total

2,320
8

1,335
86

3,655
94

tially. Put simply, in the baseline case
2.4% of the nationsparticipate,but under
the treatments6.1% join.
While the left half of the table demonstratesthat exposureto any treatmentincreasesthe likelihoodof joininga war, we
need to examine the effect of increasing
numbers of treatments.Nations may at
the same time have various types of warring borders, may be the members of
severalalliancesof differenttypes having
membersin the war or, more likely, have
some combinationof warringbordersand
alliances. Table 3 displays the cross
tabulationof war involvementagainstthe
number of treatmentsto which a nation
was exposed. It is clearfrom the data that
as the amount of exposureincreases,the
rateof participationincreasesas well. The
overall relationship(see Table 4) as measured by the correlationratio (eta), derived from a one-way analysis of variance, is .452.
The analysis has not thus far clarified
which of the variables makes the greatest difference.There are, unfortunately,
some difficultiesin makingsuchan assessment. Our dependent variable, war in-

Table 3. War Diffusion and Number of Treatments to Which a Nation Was Exposed
War
involvement

0

1

2

No
Yes
Percentageyes

2,320
8
.3

703
9
1.2

372
17
4.3
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Numberof Treatments
3
4
5
142
12
7.8

57
10
14.9

34
16
32.0

6

> 6

12
7
36.8

15
15
50.0
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Table 4. Analysis of Variance for Treatments in Table 3
Sourceof Variation
Treatments
Error

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Squares

18.737
72.906

13a
3,735

1.441
.20

Note: F - 73.839, p < .001, eta - .452.
aThedegreesof freedomarefrom the uncollapsedtable,

volvement, is dichotomous,which means
that the usual techniques of regression
and correlationare not appropriate.Normally, one could approachthis type of a
problem with log-linearanalysis, but an
analysis based upon dichotomies of the
six possible independent variables and
war involvement would produce a table
of 128 cells. Given the largetotal number
of observationswe have, this would not
ordinarilybe a problem; but in this instance only 94 of the cases indicate war
diffusion, and allocating these in a very
large table would produce such a large
numberof emptycells that analysiswould
be questionable.
Fortunately,it is possible to gain estimates of the effects of the various indeTable 5. ProbitEstimatesof Treatment
Variableson War Involvement,
1816-1965
Parameter

Estimate

Constant
Bi
B2
B3
Al
A2
.
A3

-2.62
.54*
.36**
.21*
.51*
.18****
.31***

t-Statistic
-31.80
9.97*
3.47**
3.77*
5.68*

pendent variables on war diffusion
throughprobit, which, althoughsensitive
to the highly skewed distributionof the
data will allow us to make a preliminary
comparison of the relative effect of the
variables on war diffusion. Table 5
displays the resultsof the probit analysis
when a nation'swar involvementis analyzed in relationto its numberof (1) contiguous WBNs (Bi); (2) cross-water
WBNs (B2); (3) colonial WBNs (B3); (4)
defenseWAPs (Al); (5) neutralityWAPs
(A2); and (6) entente WAPs (A3). The
estimatesit gives for the independentvariables are generallyequivalentto the estimatesof beta reportedin regressions.The
resultsgiven in Table5 are generallyconsistent with the ideas of opportunityand
willingness;that is, for the border variables Bi has greaterweight in influencing
war joining than B2, and B2 has more
than B3. The alliancevariablesare slightly different. While Al counts the most
among these variables,A3 influenceswar
joiningmuch more than A2; in fact, from
this analysisA2 seems to have little or no
effect on war joinings1

How Much Do the Variables
Contributeto War Diffusion?

1.36****

3.14***

Note: Bi = contiguousborders,B2 cross-water
borders,B3 colonialborders,Al
defensealliances, A2
neutrality agreements,and A3
ententes.
*p < .01.
**p < .02.
***p> .05.
****p> .10.
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Thus far, our analysis has indicated
that any exposureto the treatmentvariables substantiallyincreasesthe chances
of a nation'sjoininga war (Table2), that
more exposure increases such chances
(Table3), and that the strengthof the impact of the treatmentvariablesis ordered

The Diffusion of War
approximatelyas our rationalefor opportunity and willingness suggested (Table
5). What the analysis has not revealedis
the magnitudeof the impact of the individual and combinedindicatorsof opportunity and willingness.
Letus beginwith a brief,but necessary,
descriptionof the relatively straightforward analysis that follows. Recall from
Table2 that we comparedthe rate of war
joining among all nations to only those
nations that had been exposed to at least
one treatmentvariable. We may now, in
effect, take Table1 apart,examinethe impact of each of the variablesindividually
on war diffusion, and then combineeach
of the border variableswith each of the
alliance variables to observe their combined impactson war diffusion.
The first 3 rows of Table 6 report the
results, for all nations of the baseline,
of being exposedto one of the threetypes
of WBNs or WAPs and the percentage
change associated with the treatment.13
Beginningwith borders, two things are
apparent. First, the presence of a WBN
has a significantimpacton war diffusion.
In each case the presenceof the treatment
producesa markedincreasein the propensity for diffusion, ranging from a 262%
increase for the contiguous borders to
slightly over 100% for the colonial
borders.14 Second, the strength of the
results is ordered as the opportunity
hypothesis predicts, with the closest
bordersproducingthe strongestresultand
the most distant borders producing the
weakest result.15

Turningto the alliancevariablesshown
in Table 6, a similarpatternmay be seen,
but with considerably stronger results.
Defense alliancesproducetfie substantial
increaseof 439%over the baseline.While
the results for neutralityagreementsand
ententes are weaker, 297% and 166%,
respectively,they are still strong. Again,
the strengthof the relationshipsis ordered
fromthe strongestto the weakestcommitments. As agents of the opportunityfor
57

interaction, both borders and alliances
meet the expectation of increasing the
probability of states' joining ongoing
wars. In additionto the increasedease of
interactionthat bordersprovide (opportunity), borders and alliancesboth individuallyincreasethe salienceof the WAPs
and WBNs and thus also the willingness
to become involved in their conflicts.
How do the border and alliance variables interactwith each other?The three
border and three alliance variablescombine, of course, to produce nine possibilities. The first three columns of Table
7, reportthe resultsof thesecombinations
for all nations. (Becausethe tablesreporting the combinationof the variablescontain eight cells, the cell correspondingto d
in Table1 is h.) It may readilybe seen that
thereis a considerableamountof interaction betweenthe borderand alliancevariables in influencingthe diffusionof war.
The most potent effect is with the combination of the contiguous WBNs and
defensiveWAPs. This should not be surprising, given our previous results and
our hierarchyof importancewithin opportunity and willingness. The latter
derivesclearlyfromthe internationalrelations literature.Most geopoliticalstudies
focus on direct contiguous borders
because of their immediate impact and
becausethey provide the most important
opportunityfor interaction.In turn, the
form of alliance that, scholars theorize,
createsthe strongestbond between states
is the defensivepact. Defense pacts provide the most importantindicatorof salience, commitment, and shared policy
preference.The magnitudeof the joint effect is, to say the least, considerable,with
the combination of these two variables
producingan increaseof 719% over the
baselinecases in producingwar diffusion.
While that result is the strongest, the
other results on the several combined
variablesalso generallyreveala considerable amount of interaction. Indeed, all
contiguousborder(Bi) and all noncolony
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cross-water (B2) effects are improved
when combined with alliance variables;
and all defense and neutrality pact (Al
and A2) effects are improvedwhen combinedwith B1 and B2. Cross-waterWBNs
and defenseWAPs, for example,combine
to producean increaseof 602% over the
baseline cases, while cross-waterWBNs
and neutralityWAPs combineto increase
war diffusion 566% over the baseline
cases. Even colonial borders (B3) and
ententes(A3), the weakestof the individual effects, produce significantincreases
on war joining when combined with the
other variables-indeed, even when combined with each other (178%).
Given the various combinationsof our
variablesit is, of course, difficultto produce an ordered prediction of their
strength, as we did with the single variables. However, it is worth noting that
when the class of the WBN is held constant and the WAP class varies, with one
exception the magnitudesof the impact
are orderedwithin the groups. The sole
exceptionis that the combinationof contiguous WBNs is stronger with entente
WAPs (413%) than it is with neutrality
WAPs (404%).
Thusfar, our considerationof the problem of war diffusion has treated all nations as if they were the same except for
their exposureto the various treatments.
Much of internationalrelations theory,
however, relies on the knowledgethat all
nations are not the same. A distinction
amongnations that traditionallyhas been
central to an overwhelmingpart of the
field of internationalrelationsis that between major and minor powers. For our
purposes, too, this is an important distinction, since there is ample reason to
believe that majorand minorpowers will
differin theirbehaviorwith respectto opportunityand willingnessin joiningwars.
Specifically,we should expect the major
powers to respond to opportunitiesthat
are cross-wateror colonialbecause,in the
first instance, they have the greater
60

capabilitiesnecessaryto becomeinvolved
and, in the secondinstance,they not only
have the capabilitiesbut are much more
likely to have colonial borders. Moreover, while minor powers certainly had
many alliances, major powers are overrepresentedamong the nations with alliances, particularlydefenseagreements.
The neatness of the analysis begins to
break down when we analyze the data
separately for the major and minor
powers in the internationalsystem. We
begin with the majorpowers. The effects
of the individual border and alliance
conditionsfor the majorpowersare given
in the middle three columns of Table 6.
Here it is evident that while each of the
variableshad a discernableeffect on war
diffusion, the results depart from the
magnitudes and orderings given in the
first three columns of the same table.
Cross-water WBNs are the strongest
bordereffect for the majorpowers as are
neutralityWAPs. As we expectfrom our
ideas about the strengthof variousforms
of opportunity,colonial WBNshave only
a weak effect.
Note, however, that alliancesaregenerally of moreimportancefor majorpowers
than arebordersand that this relationship
is strongerfor major powers than for all
states combined. By definition, major
powers are the actors with global (or at
least multiregional)interestsand capabilities. They would be more likely to be
able to dominate smaller neighbors. As
such, the greaterimpactof alliancesis not
surprising.
The middle three columns of Table 7
presentthe combinationsof variablesfor
the majorpowers. Again, thereis clearinteractioninvolved in these combinations,
some of them astonishinglylarge. Indeed,
every individualconditionimproveswith
the combinedeffects of bordersand alliances. The combinationof colonialWBNs
and neutralityWAPs, for example, produces an increase over the baseline of
813%. As might be suspectedin the case
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of such a sharp increase, the numberof
cases is small (N = 3). Similarly, the
cross-waterWBNs and neutralityWAPs
producea gain of 1,019% for four cases.
More surprising,perhaps,than the size
of some of the gains observedis the fact
that the combination that previously
demonstratedthe largest gain, the combinationof contiguousWBN and defense
WAP, for the majorpowers, shows only a
modest increase. Here the gain is only
302%;and while suchan increaseis not to
be ignored, its modest size relative to
some of the other combinationsof variablesis not in accordwith what we would
expect from our interpretationof opportunity and willingnessor the findingspresented above. The significant increase
found in the effects of B3 (colonial
borders)in combinationwith all alliance
types may be relatedto Most and Starr's
(1980)findingson colonialbordersabove.
While the numbers of cases are rather
small, it is clearthat the combinedeffects
of colonial borders and alliances-(farflung) opportunityand willingness-now
match the earlierfindingsand arguments
about the interestsand capabilitiesof major powers. These findings give us some
anticipationof what will be found with
the minorpowers, to which we now turn.
The last threecolumnsof Table6 report
the individualeffectsof WBNsand WAPs
for the minor powers. First, it may be
noted that with two glaring exceptions
(B2 and B3, where the increasesare very
low) the treatmentvariableshad cleareffects. The strongest of these was the
presenceof defenseWAPs, where the increasewas 451%. In addition, the results
are ordered as our discussion of the
strength of the various indicators suggests. Comparing the results for major
powers (the middle three columns) and
minorpowers, the latterare more strongly affected both by contiguous borders
(M1)and defense pacts (Al). The first
finding is expected. Minor powers, virtually by definition, are those with local
61

or regionalconcerns.Giventhe limited
abilityof minorpowersto projectpower
and thus theirgreaterconcernwith viability in termsof immediateneighbors,
direct borders should be of greatest
importance.
TheAl results,however,aremoreintriguing.Previousworkby Siversonand
King (1979)has demonstrated
that alliances are likely "agents"of diffusion.
Suchresearchresultsdirectlyaddressthe
war-alliancerelationshipthat is of concern to many scholarsand the related
assertionthatalliancesactas conduitsfor
the spreadof international
conflict(e.g.,
see Starr1978b).Alliancesmightbring
greatpowerconflictintotheregionalsubsystemsof smallallies.Conversely,alliancesmightdragmajor,poweralliesinto
thelocalconflictsof theirsmalleralliance
partners.Sincethe bulkof minorpower
defensive alliances are with major
powers,theAl resultsappearto indicate
in which directionthe allianceconflict
conduit has tended to work-minor
powers being pulled into the ongoing
warsof theirmajorpowerallies.
Thelastthreecolumnsof Table7 report
the resultsof the nine combinationsof
variablesfor the minorpowers.Again,
someof theincreasesare,to saytheleast,
sharp.Thesituationwherewe expectthe
largestincrease,contiguousWBNsand
defenseWAPs, does indeed show the
strongestincrease,with a magnitudeof
over 1,000%.Moreover,this time, the
numberof cases is not small. The first
four variable combinationsall show
markedincreases,then somethinginterestingtakesplace.
Oncethe moredistantformsof opportunity and willingnessare encountered,
In fact,for
theresultsdropsubstantially.
in the tablethe
the last six combinations
resultsare eithermeageror nonexistent.
Forall of thesecases,thecombinedtreatmentresultsarelessthantheeffectsof the
individualtreatments;that is, the combinedconditionsmakewardiffusionless
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likely.Forthe firsttimethe resultsshow
negativeinteraction.One may initially
suspectthat this resultis nothingmore
thantheartifactof variablecombinations
producingnumbersof casesso smallthat
they disappear.But,as shownin thelast
threecolumnsof Table7, this is not the
case. Whilethe numberof casesdoesgo
down becauseof the combination,they
are certainlytoo big simplyto attribute
the absenceof an effectto thatartifact.
The more likely explanationis to be
foundin thefactthatthesecombinations
do indeed representthe more distant
formsof opportunityand lessertypesof
willingness and that minor powers,
becauseof their lesser capabilities,are
eitherreluctantor unableto enterconflict. Wars,afterall, do imposecostson
andminorpowersmay not
participants;
occupy positions where the costs are
tolerable.

ings. First,recall that we explicitlystated
that we are working within a framework
of 'loose necessity." Under this circumstance we expect that there will be many
"error"cases but that such error is more
apparentthan real. The requirementsof
opportunity and willingness do not predict that a nation exposed to these conditions will join a war but only that its
probabilityof joiningwill be substantially
higher than where those conditions are
not present.This situationis quite similar
to that encounteredby Bueno de Mesquita (1981)in his considerationof the initiation of war. In his analysis it may be
seen that nations have positive expected
utility for war far more than they actually
go to war, while in this researchthereare
far moreWBN-WAPinteractionopportunitiesthanthereareinstancesof diffusion.
In this researchthe importanceof the
idea of necessity may be seen in Table 1.
The concern with overprediction is
reflectedin the numberof cases in cell b.
However, for necessaryrelationshipsthe
A Problem?
number of cases in b is irrelevant. The
Before drawing the results together relevant cell to compare to cell d is c,
thereis a problem,orpuzzle,thatmustbe which should be empty. Given our 'loose
addressed.Throughoutthe dataanalysis necessity"formulation,we should expect
it may be seen that thereis a consistent only a few cases in c, especially as a
patternwhereinthenumberof nationsex- percentageof the total numberof cases in
posed to the varioustreatmentsis very the no-treatmentcolumn (i.e., the a + c
largerelativeto the numberof nations column). Returningto the right half of
who actuallyjoin the war. Consider,for Table 2, it is clearthat althoughthereare
example,the data in the right half of a very large number of cases in the noTable2, whichofferthe clearestdisplay treatmentcolumn (2,320), there are only
of this pattern.The data in that table eight in cell c. Similarrelationshipsoccur
show 1,421 cases of nationsexposedto in the matricesthat provide most of our
any of the treatments;but only 86 in- results. (In the example given in n. 13
stancesof the exposureresultin the na- reportingthe resultsof contiguousWBNs
tionsjoininga war. To be sure,the pro- thereare only 27 cases in c out of a possiportionof thosejoiningunderthe treat- ble 2,977 cases.)
mentis considerably
largerthanunderthe
Thereis a secondway to investigatethe
baseline,but it is nonethelessperplexing "error"cases. It is instructiveto examine
that only 6.44%of the casesexposedto once again the data in the right half of
any formof the treatmentjoineda war.
Table2. Thereit may be seen that most of
There are a numberof possibleap- the "error"is to be found in the cases in
proachesto evaluatingtheimpactof these which a nation was exposed to only one
casesto the validityof our find- of the treatments.The 703 "error"cases
"error"
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Conclusion

Table 8. Occurrenceof SingleBorder
and Alliance Treatments,All Nations,
1816-1965

This study beganwith the aim of investigatingthe diffusionof war-in termsof
the expansion of ongoing conflict-bePercentage
Numberof
tween 1816 and 1965. This was done in
of Total
SingleTreatments
Variable
the context of opportunity and willing46
131
328
ness,
as indicatedby WBNs and WAPs.
10.5
75
B2
have
We
proposeda relativelysimpleex36.4
259
B3
pectation derived from the opportunity,
1.4
10
Al
6
.8
A2
willingness, and interactionopportunity
34
4.8
A3
conceptsand investigatedit througha set
of comparisons between treatment and
Note: 131 contiguous borders, B2
cross-water
no-treatment
groups of data. The data
=
defensealliborders,B3 colonial borders,Al
presentedin the tablessupportthe contenances, A2
neutrality agreements,and A3
ententes.
tion that war does expandamongnations
along the indicators that operationalize
opportunityand willingnessand that the
strengthof the relationshipis orderedby
under that condition represent52.7% of
the type of borderor alliance,as hypoththe total "error.' As exposure goes up, the
rate of war joininggoes up quite sharply. esized.
We have addedto the understandingof
The question now is whether or not the
712 cases (i.e., the 703 cases of "error" war diffusionin severalways. While one
and the 9 cases of war joining) that re- body of previous researchhas indicated
ceived only single treatmentsare distrib- an importantgeographicbasis for diffuuted evenly across the opportunity and sion and otherresearchhas indicatedthat
willingnessvariables.Table 8 summarizes alliancesare importantin spreadingconflict, the present work has the virtue of
this distribution.Clearly, exposure to a
singleB1 or B3 happenedfairlyfrequently combininggeographicand political variables so that the strong interaction of
but did not have much of an effect.
Thereis at least one interestingimplica- these two elementsmay be observed.
The scope of the presentanalysisis also
tion that may be drawn from the above
observations:decisionsto join an ongoing more extensive than previous studies of
war face considerable"friction."A single war diffusion. The data used are global
opportunityis rarelyassociatedwith war (not limited to any single geographic
joining. It is only when the opportunities region) and cover all internationalwars
begin to accumulate,or, more important- from 1816 to 1965.16We provideseparate
analyses of major and minor powers,
ly, are attached to the political affinity indicatedby an alliancethat the chancesof revealing different patterns of diffusion
joiningan ongoingwar beginto buildsig- and indicating how major and minor
nificantly. The fact that wars are, in a powers differentially relate to the elesense, undersubscribedis not surprising. ments of opportunityand willingness.
Theoriesof collectivegoods tell us that it
Perhapsmost useful to the theoretical
is not rationalfor a nation to undertakea
development of the study of war diffucostly courseof actionif someoneelse will
sion, we have presentedmore evidenceas
do it for them (Olson and Zeckhauser to the applicabilityof researchbased on
1966) and wars can be among the most opportunity,willingness,and their intercostly of all the coursesof action a nation action. We have shown here that this
may choose.
theoretical approach is applicable to
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war as delineatedby the Corlarge-scale
relatesof War Project'sdata set. The
previousapplications
of thisapproachby
MostandStarrfocusedviolentconflicton
a smallerscale,whetherinternalor external.
We also have more confidencein the
theoreticalscopeof this approach,since
we now findthatit canhelpexplaintwo
differentconceptualizations
of diffusion:
(1) the linkage-penetration
view takenin
earlierresearch
by MostandStarr(among
others),whereeventselsewherechangea
state's dispositionto behave similarly;
and (2) the infection-contagion
approach
takenhere,wherediffusionis conceived
as the growthof ongoingwars.
Therefinement
of suchanalytictoolsis
vitalin thedesignof futureresearch.With
multiplesourcesof evidenceindicating
that diffusionprocessesof variouskinds
do existin international
relations,we now
requirefurtherwork in the specification
of the processesat workin variouskinds
of diffusion, includingthe conditions
underwhichthe diffusionof violentconflicttakesplace.Thefurtherspecification
of these processesmight also help us
understandthe interactionbetweenopportunityand willingnessand various
theoriesas to why warsare likelyto be
timesthanat others.
largerat particular
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1. While diffusionhas been given severalmeanings, andhas a numberof dimensions,we will be using it essentiallyto mean the growth of an ongoing
conflict,the processby which statesjoin an ongoing
war and the scope of the conflictbecomesenlarged.
Theconceptof diffusionandits theoreticalrelevance
to the study of internationalconflictis reviewedextensivelyin Most, Starr,andSiverson1989.Forother
reviewsof the diffusionconcept,see Most and Starr
1981,O'Loughlin1984and Welsh1984.Foran over64

view of the renewed interest in geopolitical approaches (including diffusion) to war, see Diehl
1988. For a classic statementon the contagionof
politicalconflict, see Schattschneider1960.
2. We use the term treatmentto emphasizethe
epidemiologicalnatureof our research,not to suggest that we are performingan experimentin which
we have the ability to randomizeand control exposure. However, what we report is in many
respectsa historicalexperiment,similarin methodto
the proceduresdescribedby Singer(1974)and Holsti
and North (1965).
3. Although researchon this point is not clear
(Garnhanm
1988), it is reasonableto suspect that
under some circumstancesgeographicalproximity
to, or sharedborderswith, some othernationwill in
themselves influence a nation's willingness to
becomeinvolved in conflict. If so, opportunityand
willingnessare not independent,as we noted. Indeed, bordersthemselvescan be seen in termsof environmentalpossibilismby providing possibilities
for interaction.The warringbordernation model,
however,can be seenin termsof cognitivebehaviorism or willingness,as activitieson a state'sborders
effectthe perceptionsof threat,uncertainty,and opportunity held by that state's decision makers.
Clearly,most nationsarelikely to be sensitiveto the
securityconcernsof neighboringnations or, when
the capabilitiesare present, are likely to see their
neighborsas the greatestpotential threatsto their
own security.
4. Of course, states may attemptto manipulate
their immediate political geography by creating
neighbors (e.g., Belgium in 1830) or eliminating
them(e.g., Polandin 1939),but the costs of theseactivities are likely to be quite high.
5. Alliances,of course,are not a perfectindicator
of willingness.For example, while there is general
tendencyfor alliancesto be reliable,it is clearthat
reliabilityis less than complete(Sabrosky1980). In
addition,some alliancesare specificto certainissues
or geographicareas (e.g., NATO), and their existence does not mean that one ally will join another
no matterwhere the conflict. Also, alliancessigned
at one timemay deterioratewhilecontinuingto exist
formally. In short, we do not construealliancesas
indicatinga generalwillingnessto fight. However,
allianceshavelong beenrecognizedas thekey means
that nations have chosen to indicatetheir political
position in the internationalsystem. Formal alliances are matters of serious concern to decision
makersand in additionto theirpresumedrewardsof
enhancedsecurity,they imposecosts and risksboth
domesticallyand internationally(Sullivan1974).
6. In fact, Altfeld and Buenode Mesquita(1979)
successfully apply expected utility theory to the
problemof explainingwhichsidenationswill joinin
a war. Whilethis is a problemsimilarto the one pursuedhere,it does not directlyaddressthe questionof
diffusion.For some other differences,see n. 16.
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7. Following Small and Singer (1982), the major
powers and the years of their inclusion in that group
are Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), Italy (18611943), the United Kingdom (1816-1965), RussiaUSSR (1816-1965), Japan (1895-1945), PrussiaGermany (1816-1945), the United States (19891965), France (1816-1940, 1945-65) and China
(1949-65).
8. This third category of data was the most difficult to obtain because of the number and almost unbelievable obscurity of some colonies. We were
aided very considerably by Henige's (1970) comprehensive list of colonial governors. This list, which
begins with the fifteenth century, identifies all political units that were the colonial possession of some
other nation. Finding them in this list then permitted
relatively easy location in one of the historical
atlases.
9. Copies of the coding scheme employed in this
study are available from Siverson. It should be
noted that in general we followed the data given by
Small and Singer (1982) with respect to war expansion. We did, however, depart from their delineation of what constituted war joining in a few cases.
For example, they show Japan as joining World War
II on 7 December 1941. While it is true that Japan
began fighting the United States on that day, it is
also true that the Japanese decision had relatively
less to do with the European war that had been in
progress since 1939 than it did Japan's war with
China that had been ongoing since 1937. Hence, we
do not treat Japan as joining the war. Also, we do
not treat as war joiners the nations that left World
War II (albeit briefly) and then changed sides (i.e.,
Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria) to reenter it. It makes
sense to count the initial participation only. It
should be noted that including these cases would
have favored the opportunity and willingness
hypotheses.
10. Recall that Most and Starr (1980) distinguished between reinforcement, or addiction (where
a state's war behavior affects the probability of its
own subsequent behavior) and diffusion (where a
state's war behavior affects the probability of the
subsequent war behavior of other states). They also
recognized that either could have positive or negative effects (either increasing or decreasing the probability of war behavior). The reader must be alerted
that the matrix employed in the present analyses
follows that utilized in Most et al. 1987 and is not the
same as the matrix used in Most and Starr 1981 or
Starr and Most 1983, 110-11.
11. The single case of war involvement by a nation with no bordering nations of any kind and no
alliance involvement is New Zealand's entry into
World War II in 1939.
12. The weak results from A2 may be partly due
to the fact that there were far fewer of this type of
alliance in the data set than either of the other two
types. When they are analyzed together, the more
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numerous alliances may overwhelm A2. In the
analysis that follows it may be seen that A2 does not
apply to a large number of cases but that when it
does, a clear effect is evident.
13. Recall the treatment matrix from Table 1. In
the single treatment tables that follow, the numbers
being reported are those from cell d of that figure.
Reporting all the tables would be cumbersome, so
only the effects of the treatments are given. As an example of what a table looks like, we offer a full table
for the treatment involving B1. Note that the
numbers of cases reported in the tables refer to the
total of the b-d column and that the percentages
reported are for d of that total.
Contiguous Warring
Bordering Nation
War Participation
Absent
Present
Total

Absent

Present

2,950
27

705
67

2,977

772

14. What we mean by percentage increase is the
magnitude by which involvement in a treatment
situation is larger than the base. Thus, the first three
columns of Table 6, while the B1 treatment percentage of 8.7 is more than three times the size of the
baseline percentage of 2.4, the relevant measurement
is the amount of increase from 2.4 to 8.7. Thus, the
appropriate calculation is the treatment percentage
minus the base percentage with the remainder divided by the base percentage.
15. The tests of significance used in Tables 6 and 7
require a brief comment. Because the percentage
changes between the no-treatment and treatment
columns are often based on relatively small numbers
of cases, the skeptical reader may be curious as to (1)
whether the observed changes are statistically significant and (2) whether there is any way that the
method could fail to produce a change, i.e., whether
the results are predetermined. With respect to the
first question, we have tested the differences for
statistical significance in two ways. First, when the
number of cases in the treatment column is greater
than 20, the p-value is derived from the Z-score in a
test of a difference of proportions. When the number
of cases is less than 20, we have determined the
p-value from Fisher'sexact test. (Recall that the cases
in the treatment column are also present in the baseline no-treatment column. Because the two results
are therefore not independent, before we could test
for statistical significance between the no-treatment
baseline and the treatment, it was necessary to
remove the treatment cases from their respective
baseline. A full set of the resulting tables is available
from Siverson.) More important than each test of
significance is the correspondence between our
theoretical structure and the overall pattern of the
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data. With respectto the second question(whether
the resultsare predetermined),if one suspectsthat
the method will always producean increasein the
observedcases of war diffusionunderthe treatment
condition, see the last three columns of Table 7,
wherefailuredoes occur.
16. Altfeldand Buenode Mesquita(1979)are interestedonly in those cases of war expansionthat
took place within the first two months of a war.
Hence,theirmain data set containsonly 40 casesof
war joining. In addition, they exclude from their
dataset theparticipationof thefourCommonwealth
nations (i.e., Canada,Australia,New Zealandand
SouthAfrica)that joinedWorldWarII in 1939, on
thegroundsof missingdata(thatis, they hadno alliance memberships).Those cases are includedhere.
We also include the cases from the KoreanWar,
whichweretotallyexcludedby AltfeldandBuenode
Mesquita(p. 94, n. 7).
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